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THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE: RUSSIA 1992 - 1995
THE STORY OF THE LAW ON RELIGION - PART II
by Yakov Krotov
Yakov Krotov is an Orthodox journalist and historian living in Moscow.
He was the editor of Khristianskii Novosti (1990-91), worked as News Analyst for the
Christian Resource Center (Moscow), his articles appearing under the name James
Krotov, and since 1993 has continued to edit a news service on religion in the Former
Soviet Union. Much of this essay appeared in German in Glaube in der 2ten Welt. Part I
appeared in the June issue, this second part was translated from the Russian by Walter
Sawatsky.

State Officials Against Missionaries
In April 1994 it became known that the former staff member of the Council of Religious
Affairs (CRA) of the USSR Council of Ministers, Genrich Mikhailov, had called a conference of
former staff of the CRA (Moscow and provinces). Mikhailov was now responsible for church
affairs in Chernomyrdin's government. At this conference he presented a draft of an amended
Law on Freedom of Religious Confession (FRC) entitled (On Freedom of Conscience, Religious
Confession and Religious Organizations). Article 17 of that bill contained the essence of the antimissionary idea:
Representatives of foreign Russian organizations (persons, speaking on its behalf)
may be active within the territory of the Russian Federation only upon invitation of a
Russian religious organization, and only within the limits of tasks foreseen in its
registered statute (constitution). Foreign religious organizations ... are not permitted to
function independently.
Campaign Against Freedom of Conscience - Summer of 1994
Discussion of the new legislative bill was delayed since the Duma only received it for a
first reading in November 1994. Metropolitan Kirill (of Smolensk & Kaliningrad), head of the
Patriarchate's External Affairs Department, had organized a conference on "Christian Faith and
Human Enmity" for June 21-23, 1994. It was called an inter-confessional conference and so it
was. It did not include representatives of all confessions, however. Among the participants the
Orthodox were in the absolute majority, which is quite natural and reflected the religious
landscape of contemporary Russia. But there was not one single representative of the Russian
Orthodox Church Underground (Church of the Catacombs literally) nor of the Russian Orthodox
Church Abroad, nor were any of the "new" Protestant communities represented. In point of fact,
the conference was less 'inter-confessional' than it was 'inter-Nomenklatura'. Instead of
representatives of all confessions meeting, it was merely those more strictly centralized, which

had existed in Russia for decades and had existed under the Bolsheviks legally.
The conference participants enthusiastically received Metropolitan Kirill's proposal to
form a committee consisting of representatives of all participant confessions. The first fruit of
this action was a meeting of that committee on July 5 at which the new legislative bill on religion
was discussed.
During the next several months there were periodic television news broadcasts, that
called for limits to freedom of conscience on behalf of the 'struggle with sectarianism'. Andrei
Politkovskii, for example, a former democratic journalist, devoted his July 8 program "Politburo"
to that end. On August 16 the organizers of the "Leaders" program invited the audience to
imagine that they were presidential advisers, and the president had prepared legislation granting
privileges to three religions - how would they react?
Religious Oversight Agencies Organized - July 9, 1994
Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai was appointed chair of the Commission on
Questions of Religious Societies of the government of the Russian Federation on July 21.
Genrich Mikhailov, former staff member of the communist Council of Religious Affairs, was
named secretary. He was the author of the proposed new legislation on freedom of conscience
and in favor of restrictions on religious freedoms. Before this appointment, Mikhailov had
headed a section of the state bureaucracy for relations with religious organizations. He was the
one who in early 1994 (journal Voprosy Filosofii, Nr. 12, 1994) had accused foreign
missionaries of espionage.
Also on July 21, 1994 the council of the State Duma approved the bill "On Reinstating
the Council of Experts for Questions of Freedom of Conscience under the Committee for Social
Unions and Religious Organizations". Staff appointments to the council only followed on
January 19, 1995, at which point some of the members of the previous council, such as Iu.
Rozenbaum, known for his support of freedom of conscience, were removed. The chair of the
council was a certain Alekseev, former functionary of the central committee of the VDKSM and
Communist Party central committee, now a member of Ziuganov's party. In practice the council
did not play a major role, leaving matters to Shakhrai's governmental committee.
The State's Proposed Legislative Bill
The state's legislative bill (the core of which had been drafted in April 1994 under
Genrikh Mikhailov's leadership) moved into an active phase for approval by the Duma in autumn
of 1994. It included four key clauses that set out four tasks for the opponents of freedom of
conscience: 1) to be able to arbitrarily forbid a religion that did not conform to their conceptions
of truth and morality; 2) to limit the actions of foreign preachers; 3) to return to the state the right
of supervisory control over religion; 4) to introduce the teaching of Orthodoxy in the schools. It
should be noted that the bill at least did not consider another measure that the nationalists and the
Moscow Patriarchate had demanded and continue to demand - to anchor in law state support of
the Patriarchate as the "traditional Russian religion".
Point 4 of Article 4 set out the first task, repeating in content and often literally the
famous "improvements" of 1993:

The formation and activity of those religious organizations are forbidden:
that violate social security and order;
that preach war, use of force, hatred or who arouse social, racial, national or
religious discord;
that employ illegal use of force in their activities;
that cause physical, psychological and moral harm of citizens, including the use of
narcotics or similar means of stupefication, carrying out depraved and similar activities
that offend public morality;
that prevent children from receiving a basic public education;
that deceive citizens about the true character of their activities;
that provoke citizens to illegal actions, and to refuse to observe a citizen's legal
obligations.
The anti-missionary task was stated in article 14 (formerly 15)
Foreign religious organizations may have a representation (representatives) with
Russian religious organizations... This representation (representatives) requires
accreditation ... The accreditation may be refused if said organization is unable to show
legal recognition in its own country or if its activities do not conform to the requirements
of articles 4 and 10 of the present law. Representatives of foreign religious organizations,
as well as foreign religious workers, may carry out public religious duties within the
territory of the Russian Federation only upon invitation of a Russian religious
organization that has a registered statute (constitution), and within the limits of the latter's
activities.
The return of official control (supervision) over religion was introduced in point 3 of article 20:
Other state organs have the right to review questions related to the activities of
religious organizations, in accord with their legally established competence on general
grounds.
The possibility that Orthodoxy would be fostered in the public schools was provided in point 4 of
article 8:
By request and in accord with the religious preference of parents or guardians,
with the agreement of the children attending a municipal and state educational institution,
the administration of such a school may make facilities available for religious education
to religious organizations having a registered statute (constitution).
Some Provincial Laws Against Freedom of Conscience - November, 1994.
The most threatening development to freedom of conscience in Russia were some laws
passed by Oblast (provinces) or city councils. These laws were illegal, and in some oblasty
attorneys protested; and no charges have been filed on the basis of these laws (because

judgments based on such legislation would be immediately reversed by Moscow). Nevertheless,
these laws are extremely dangerous because they signal provincial officials how to conduct
themselves toward non-Orthodox religions. The majority of such laws have not been made
known to the public. Such a law for Vologda Oblast was not printed in the public record nor
circulated to officials. Well known was the text of a similar law from Tula Oblast "On
Missionary (Religious) Activities within the Territory of Tula Oblast", signed on November 21,
1994 by N. V. Sevriugin, the chair of the Tula Oblast Duma and also governor of the Oblast,
hence Yeltsin's direct representative. The law was intended to define the "procedures for
accreditation" of missionaries in Tula Oblast. Its first clause stated that missionary activities
without accreditation were forbidden. Article 5 had in view the introduction of a special position:
a plenipotentiary under the governor for religious questions, who was to administer the
accreditation. Accreditation required numerous documents, including (art. 6) "copies of the
founding document of the foreign religious organization ... notarized" (what might the author of
the law have imagined as "founding document" for the Catholic church). Moreover, Article 6
stated:
If necessary, the accrediting organ has the right to request additional documents,
concerning the activities of the foreign religious organization, confession, being
represented, or to request an explanation of the regulations in the founding document.
The granting of such unlimited 'rights' to the officials means that they could delay the
accreditation indefinitely. And further, the accreditation was only good for a year (Art. 12).
Article 15 stated:
Accreditation... may be refused... if the activities of the foreign religious
organization are linked with nationalist, racist or religious hate mongering, or if harmful
to a citizen's health or other violations of the person's rights and personhood, or other
similar illegal actions.
Analagous laws were passed in Amur, Sakhalin, Kostroma, Tver, Tiumen oblasty. In
December 1995 an analagous law was passed in the St. Petersburg City Duma; at the time of
writing it was not yet known whether Mayor A. Sobchak would sign it. An anti-missionary law
is in preparation for Udmurtia.
The President Steps in to Protect Freedom of Conscience - January 10, 1995
The state bill received a sharply worded critique from the office of the President (the
letter was signed by P. Orekhov, head of the governmental-legal administration of the President
and was addressed to the deputy head of the state administration, dated January 19, 1995). (It
should be noted that the enumeration of the bill's clauses, indicated in the excerpts [in the letter],
do not correspond to the published text of the bill, though the text itself was not changed, merely
some transposition of paragraphs). The writer observed correctly that the bill restored to current
legislation the odious phrase "to guarantee public security" that had been eliminated from the
constitution (art. 3, pt. 3). The crucial clause, point 4 of article 4, so the legal opinion, should be
struck out completely. The writer drew attention to the fact that "it is impossible to speak of a
uniform morality in society, ... it is not permitted to include moral criteria as the basis for making
judicially significant decisions." Further he reminded the legislators that article 28 of the
constitution guarantees freedom of conscience to each individual, which means that the entire

article 14 limiting the rights of foreigners in Russia, is unconstitutional.
It should be noted that the presidential administration is that large, that it is impossible to
expect uniform views on all issues. So on February 10 A. Loginov, administrative official for
cooperation with political parties, social organizations, groups and deputies of the federal (upper)
house sent a letter to the Duma where he ardently supported the bill and expressed his concern
about the "violation of the historically complex ethno-confessional balance within the country".
Parliamentary Hearing "On Freedom of Conscience" - February 14, 1995
The Committee for Freedom of Conscience on February 14 organized a parliamentary
hearing "On the Freedom of Conscience and Human Rights in the Russian Federation". The
organizers, apparently, had at first planned to adopt a resolution ("Recommendation"), which
would propose that the Duma accept the revisions of V. Savitsky to the Law on Freedom of
Confession (see text below), and that the government "Adopt the Statute on Accreditation of
Foreign Religious Organizations." However, while the hearing was being prepared the
proponents of freedom of conscience in the Duma apparat succeeded in inviting not only
opponents of freedom of conscience but also some of its supporters. The presentation by Eileen
Barker, professor at London University, in which she detailed the technical impossibility of
distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' religions, and the possibility (and necessity) of charging
'bad' religious workers exclusively with violations of criminal law and only for criminality, drew
marked attention. The papers from the hearing were published in a brochure, together with the
text of the Law on Religious Confession, the proposed legislation of the governmental apparatus
and other materials. The Moscow Patriarchate demonstratively boycotted the hearing, which
earned it the indignation of the press.
A Vote on Valeri Savitsky's Revisions - April 14, 1995
Soon after the parliamentary reading (March 20) something occurred that decisively
strengthened the hand of the opponents of freedom of conscience: the explosion in the Tokyo
subway which was traced to the AUM Sinrike sect. The Russian newspapers launched a wave of
antisectarian hysteria, in which the criticisms of the AUM Sinrike constantly shifted into a
critique of all non-Orthodox religions in general.
On April 14, 1995 the State Duma approved in a first reading the proposed federal bill of
amendments to the law existing since 1990 "On Freedom of Religious Confession". The text for
the amendments was drafted by Duma deputy Valeri Savitsky, Christian Democrat, elected as a
member of Grigory Yavlinsky's bloc. The amendment (to article 4 of FRC) was simple and fit on
a single page: "The formation and activity of religious societies that violate the security of the
state and social order is forbidden." That would have sufficed with nothing further to say. The
meaning of "state security" and "social order" were that vague and allowed broad and loose
interpretation so that almost any organization could have been accused of violating them. But
Savitsky did not stop there but proposed to ban organizations, which "rely on force in their
activities, endanger the physical and psychic health of a citizen, using drugs and similar
substances; prevent children from getting a basic education, or induce citizens to violate the
law."
In essence Savitsky proposed a separate vote on point 4 of article 4 of the legislative bill.

This irritated state officials and slowed down the entire process of restricting freedom of
conscience as a whole.
Proposed Legislation on Property Rights of Religious Organizations - April 21, 1995
Father Viacheslav Polosin and A. Glagolev on April 15 produced the fifth version of
legislation "On the Property of Religious Organizations", which proposed state aid to Orthodoxy
and discrimination against foreign preachers. The bill, with amendments and revisions, was
announced on April 21 as a legislative initiative of the Democratic Party of Russia. Yet another
bill was drafted in the Duma in May 1995 which indirectly sought to forbid missionary activity.
The preface to the bill quite inappropriately contrasted American standards of behavior and
thought with Russian norms. At the same time the preface pretended that the proposed measures
are accepted in the "laws of all civilized countries of the world". It would seem one should
choose one or the other - originality or civilization.
The preface violates the principle of the separation of the church from the state, stating
that today "separation of church from state" counts for less than a necessary "union of state and
representatives of believers of diverse confessions". Such a formula is dangerous for it
distinguishes from believers in general special "representatives of believers", a kind of religious
officialdom. Other points of concern are the following:
The proposed bill interprets the theme of regulation extensively. In fact it replaces the
Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (FRC). Article 2 point 4 affirms,
for example, that the Law "regulates the relations of religious organizations, their enterprises and
foundations with the organs of state", but this is already regulated by article 6 of the existing law.
Article 3 of the bill elucidates "special terminology of the law". On the one side,
however, certain explanations contradict current legislation (the definition of a religious
organization in point 1 contradicts the definition given in article 7 of the FRC). Other
explanations rely on imprecise religious terms - point 7 specifies that "national heritage" is to be
defined by the law on cultural legacy and national heritage. One section utilizes non-juridical
terms, such as describing "property of the cult" as an "organic unity", more a philosphical than
juridical term.
The definitions provided in article 3 do not distinguish between a religious organization
and a religious society as provided for in the FRC, which leads to lack of clarity on the
ownership of cultic objects, and on who is the juridical person in transactions and relations. The
definitions introduce terms that are themselves undefined, as in point 5 which distinguishes
between religious organizations and confessions but does not clarify the difference.
Much more uncertain, juridically speaking, is point 2 of article 3 which speaks of
"professional religious activities", a concept absent both from the FRC and from the legislation
of civilized countries. Its absence is not accidental, for it is practically impossible to keep
distinctions clear between preaching of religious doctrine privately and professionally, between
preaching a confession of faith and its inner churchly interpretation. Finally, the lawmakers seek
to place a professional activity into a special category whenever it concerns licensing of an
activity. At times the bill adheres strictly to the idea of licensing (art. 32), restricting religious
preachers by means of regulating them by state organs. That contradicts both the Constitution of

the Russian Federation as well as FRC (art. 3), since those maintain the independence of the
citizen in terms of relation to religion, the expression and spreading of one's convictions with
regard to religion. It also contradicts the constitutional norms in all of article 19, by introducing
restrictions on professional religious activity - only permitted for those members of religious
organizations or to persons who have signed a contract with a religious organization. Moreover
to take part in religious activities professionally one should have the right also of private
personhood, if under that is understood "public confession and spreading of faith". Here the
definition of professional religious activity in article 3, point 2 includes two features: confession
of faith and signing a contract with the organization. Further on in the text of the bill these
features are understood as exhaustive. The second feature however, is not exhaustive, since the
occupation of professional religious worker must be open to private persons. The FRC does not
prohibit private persons from preaching, also professionally. Indeed it presumes such a right and
in general establishes the right of confession "singly or together". Here is the key point showing
the ideological intent of the bill: by means of regulating economic activities, to restrict the rights
of ideological activity.
Article 3 of the FRC also contradicts articles 37 and 38 of the proposed bill which
envisions a special order of privilege for state financing of religious preachers "directed toward
fostering the growth of national-cultural and spiritual-moral traditions of the peoples of the
Russian Federation". The proviso "on condition of observing the freedom of the citizen to
choose" merely brings a contradiction to the text rather than enabling the protection of freedoms.
The determination of what helps to develop a tradition and what does not is highly debatable and
practically speaking cannot be regulated by law.
Article 5 point 3 envisions that all the gains from enterprises and foundations belonging
to religious organizations be directed toward the constitutionally stated activities of the religious
organization. Article 4 point 1 speaks however, not of all the gains, but only of the
"predominate" part which leads to the question of subjectively identifying such items correctly.
The profits can be termed noncommercial in character when asking "not whether the profits
result from its main tasks, but whether such profits help the property to the realization of the
stated goals". In such a way the question of profit becomes a declaration of intention. The term
"predominately" lacks juridical character. Not having defined numerically the profits which the
organization would designate toward its stated goals, the bill opens the way to misuse and
machinations. Moreover here we have the key economic idea of the bill in general. The call to
"establish conditions for the formation of honest business" is ignored since by definition there is
no business without profit. The bill substitutes the idea of tax privileges for a charitable
enterprise with the idea of total tax immunity (and other privileges) for enterprises, that have
come under the jurisdiction of a religious organization.
Point 4 of article 6 assumes a religious organization ..."with the right of contracting...
profit taking, when its enterprises and foundations are considered to be fostering the statutory
aims of the religious organization". But the term "has the right" has a permissive character, that
is "profit taking" could also be unstipulated or noncommerical or the organization exists only
fictitiously. Further, by leaving to the discretion of the subject the determination of profit, the bill
opens up unlimited possibilities for abuse by individual managers and staff, for greedy
settlements.
The third major conceptual idea of the bill, that of restitution, is an attempt to solve a

problem common to the entire country, by means of singling out one part, namely the churchly,
which is not justified in itself. The problem of restitution is very complicated, and for religious
organizations it is even more complicated because of the principle of separation of church from
state. Thus subpoint 'a' of point 2, article 7 provides, that in case of conflict the court will decide
a case of succession on the basis of "succession of religious confession". In such a way, a purely
religious conflict gets moved into the sphere of a secular jurisdiction. Experience shows that one
cannot decide issues thus: the Old Believers consider themselves the true successors of the
Church, but on the basis of certain texts (as the bill proposes) their position would be impossible,
since all texts in a given situation would be subject to religious dispute.
Article 10 presumes the inviolability of cult objects. If point 2 of that article presumes the
impossibility of sale of cult objects, that contradicts the necessity of selling cult objects after
their manufacture or in the process of transferring the object to another owner.
The President Forms his Own Office for Preserving Freedom of Conscience - April 24,
1995
President Yeltsin on April 24 signed an order to create a Council for Cooperation with
Religious Bodies directly under the President of the Russian Federation. A. A. Krasikov was
appointed the general secretary, with a staff of five from the Presidential Administration, thus
creating a department within that administration for cooperation with religious bodies. Officially
it was stated that this had been done upon the "initiative of representatives of various religious
bodies" and "with the intent of facilitating the cooperation of the President of the Russian
Federation with religious bodies and to enhance the spiritual culture of society".
On the same day the president signed a letter addressed to the Duma, his way of ending
the bill passed on April 14 to amend the Law on Freedom of Conscience. Yeltsin served notice
that he would not sign the amendments:
The notion underlying the bill ... to regulate relations which are fundamentally
already regulated by the constitution... Therefore, according to point 5 of article 13 of the
Constitution it is forbidden to organize and conduct a social union (obshchestvennykh
ob'edinenii), the purpose and actions of which is directed toward forcefully changing the
base of the constitutional structure and violating the integrity of the Russian Federation,
undermining the security of the state, forming armed units, inciting social, racial, national
and religious hatred. The Consitution of the Russian Federation... treats religious
organizations as social or societal organizations, since in article 13 of the Constitution it
speaks primarily of ideological diversity, including also religious world views. Applied to
article 14 of the Constitution one should keep in mind, that the special understanding of
religion and religious bodies evident there is due to the fact that there the secular
character of the Russian Federation is articulated, but in article 13 of the Constitution the
democratic feature comes out. Therefore religious bodies appear, from the perspective of
the Constitution, as social entities/unions, even though they bear several specific
characteristics, which are taken into consideration in the current Russian Law on
Freedom of Religious Confession.
Clash of Legislative Bills - May 1995

In the struggle on behalf of the Law on Freedom of Religious Confession, the democratic
deputies, Father GlebYakunin and Valerii Borshchev decided to present a counter bill, named
"On the Freedom of Conscience and Guarantees for its Observance". This bill was a unique
juridical case, because it merely corroborated that the Law on Freedom of Religious Confession
is the law in effect and repeated its points guaranteeing freedom of religious confession. The text
of the bill is of interest only because it helps to understand what violations of freedom of
conscience had emerged by the autumn of 1995 and how widespread they were. Thus by that
time the practice of concluding contracts between the Moscow Patriarchate and individual
ministries and organs of executive power had increased. The public was particularly upset about
a contract with the war ministry. Orthodox churches were to be built in military schools with
state funds, clergy were being appointed, were given the possibility to serve in special units,
where they were de facto in service, but not the bearing or use of arms (this was during the time
of the war with Chechenia). The municipal organs generously financed the restoration and new
building of the Patriarchal Cathedral, but refused to return destroyed churches to the control of
other confessions. With each contract, the Patriarch and the state official declared that with time
similar contracts would be concluded with Muslims and Jews, but not once was this done. To
quote from the text of the Yakunin-Borshchev bill, "the establishment of any sort of privilege for
one or several religious unions by the state and municipal organs is not permitted.... The state
provides no material support to religious and similar ideological unions. Civil servants, including
the military, do not have the right to use their positions to influence citizens in their choice of
relation to religion". (art. 5) "Education in all state and municipal educational institutions bears a
secular character" (art. 6). On May 18 the bill was read in the Duma Council and sent to the
Committee for Freedom of Conscience.
New Reframing of Amendments - October 5, 1995
By autumn of 1995 politicians were acting as if they had completely forgotten that the
Duma had already passed the first reading of the amendments to the FRC. Instead the
governmental apparatus attempted to get the Committee on Freedom of Conscience to consider
its own bill as requiring a vote in the Duma. Within that committee a reworking of amendments
together with those of Savitsky and Yakunin was produced. This "reframing" was approved by
the committee at its meeting on October 5, 1995. The text was a compromise between that of
Yakunin and Borshchev and the opponents of freedom of conscience. Completely contradictory
ideas were mechanically united. One amendment (to art. 4) consisted of the democratic
phraseology from Yakunin and Borshchev: "Russia is a secular state. No single religion may be
established as the state religion.... Establishing any sort of privilege or restriction for one or
several religious organizations is not permitted". Other amendments repeated the idea of
restrictions: "Religious organizations whose aims and actions violate social security and order,
that undermine state security... inflict damage on morality, are forbidden to exist." The February
1995 version of article 4 (see above) had contained a long list of causes for banning the activity
of a religious organization. By autumn of 1995 this list together with further amendments were
moved to article 12, the text virtually unchanged. The anti-missionary point became article 11,
unchanged in its essence.
State of Affairs After Elections in December 1995
At the elections to the State Duma on December 17, 1995 parties of the left (Communists
and Zhirinovtsy nationalists) gained a majority over those of the Nomenklatura ("Our Home is

Russia"). The sole opposition party was that of Grigory Yavlinsky, who never showed the
slightest personal interest in the theme of religion. Among the deputies who retained their seats
were communists who had already controlled the committee on religion in the previous Duma
(Viktor Zorkaltsev remained its chair). Of the deputies for the next Duma who might stand on
the side of democratic principles of freedom of conscience, one can name only Sergei Kovalev
and Valerii Borshchev. Father Gleb Yakunin, formerly actively defending democracy in the
religious sphere, was ousted by Vitalii Borov during the elections and did not get back into the
Duma. Valeri Savitsky died in an auto accident on the eve of the elections.
The law of Freedom of Religious Confession (FRC) of 1990 remains in effect, though in
practice its democratic principles are not observed.
What were the results of the attack on freedom of conscience? Though the FRC of
October 25, 1990 remains in effect, in all the areas where those siding with restricting the FRC
were active, they were successful. This is significant in Russia where the judicial system remains
subordinate, as before, to the executive powers and where what is important is not so much the
law as the common unwritten rights and traditions of behavior.
1. The Possibility to Prohibit Any Religious Organization. In April of 1995 the Russian
branch of AUM Sinrike was banned. No matter what one's attitude to this movement, one should
note that it's prohibition was carried out in gross violation of the law. In essence, they were given
one sole reason for rescinding the registration and confiscating the AUM building in Moscow,
namely that the organization was headed by a citizen of a foreign country and its headquarters
were outside Russian territory. This signifies, that by the same understanding it is possible to ban
the activity of the Roman Catholic church, plus other confessions whose headquarters are outside
Russian borders. Attempts to appeal the decisions of officials on refusing registration or
withdrawing such registration were met with obstructionism and red tape, and the downright
refusal of the courts to review an appeal. That leaves only the appeal to an international human
rights organization, which means nothing to Russian officials. The violation of the rights of
believers is not the sort of subject for which the international community would initiate an
economic boycott or threaten with war, and this type of nomenklatura is completely insensitive
to other sanctions.
2. Restricting Activity of Preachers. There are no juridical restrictions, but there are
restrictions in practice. As before the state maintains a monopoly on all land, the officials control
all space where one might organize a large gathering. To be granted a building or land depends
on the good will of an official and his personal material interests. Fortunately, the majority of
local and provincial officials currently are indifferent to religious questions and in exchange for
money, will do what is written in law. If, however, some religious organization comes under fire
from the higher authorities, no single court or official will defend it according to the law. That is
also true for treatment of Russian religious workers, and especially for foreigners. Even the
hierarchy of the Catholic church appealed in 1995 that priests from Poland and Italy were not
getting the statutary registration from the authorities. The notification process was itself
transformed into a licencing one, against the Law on Religious Confession. Foreign preachers
were obliged to function in accordance with the law on professional work of foreign citizens, that
is, to go through an especially complicated visa registration process. Often the official did not
grant the said registration. No one has yet decided to appeal an official's decision to the courts,
since this would involve subjecting oneself to Russia's complex system of due process.

3. State support of Orthodoxy. In state schools, in violation of article 9, if the director
wishes or one student requests it, they often "form a relationship to religion", usually to foster
Orthodoxy, granting the right to teach Bible. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk, in listing some
successes, noted that they had closed a number of Sunday Schools in Smolensk Oblast, because
the children were receiving similar teaching in the state schools. At various levels, the executive
branch is financing the construction of Orthodox cathedrals, and offers the Moscow Patriarchate
land for investment. Banks and businesses, even private individuals upon pressure from officials
(who can exert pressure on private business through the system of privilege and favors) direct
large sums of money to the publishing and building projects of the Patriarchate. Television
shows where an Orthodox preacher appears or shows about Orthodoxy get more air time than do
foreign preachers, because the Orthodox get a financial advantage over foreigners in buying air
time.
4. State Controls over Religion. There are numerous commissions at all levels of
executive and legal authority, which in fact exercise state control over religious organizations,
even though article 11 prohibits such and "special entites for deciding issues related to the
citizen's right to exercise the freedom of religious confession" are clearly forbidden by Article 8.
It is true, that with reference to the terms 'control' and 'decide' no one is saying a commission
may not play the role of "informing government", "consulting", "providing expertise",
"coordinating action" or "preparing recommendations" for duly empowered legislative and
executive authorities. At the same time, deputies tend to follow the instructions of officials. For
the sake of decency, representatives of the "traditional" confessions are included in the make up
of commissions, but only those persons who beforehand have already agreed to defer to the state
officials heading the commissions.
Contrary to the provisions of article 7 of FRC and the Russian Constitution, thus far
persons have not had the right to refuse military service for reasons of religious conviction and to
do alternative service.
The sole sphere where the struggle against freedom of conscience has not had much
success is in publishing and business activity. The Moscow Patriarchate did not succeed in
getting a monopoly on iconography, the production of worship utensils nor the publication of
church literature. All kinds of literature are published freely, if there is money for it.
Thanks to the significant degree of freedom officials have from control from above,
foreign and non-Orthodox preachers as before have in practice had the possibility to preach in
schools, if for example, they make an agreement with the school director.
During the past four years of struggle, the opponents of freedom of conscience formed
some stereotypical assumptions, which seem self-evident to them. So for example the legal
regulation that religion may not violate human rights they understand to mean that the wife and
children have the right to a husband and father, but the father who leaves family to participate in
a religious movement, violates a human right. (They ignore the fact, that this logic not only
forces one to condemn the AUM Sinrike sect, but also to condemn Russian monasticism). All
these people put the security and rights of society and of the state (they do not distinguish
between these two understandings) above those of the rights of the individual.
The conduct of journalists has also changed during the past four years. They have

become more cautious with regard to religion. Their blind excited celebration of any new
religion, characteristic of the years 1990-91, is gone. Although all the newspapers took part in
the hysteria surrounding AUM Sinrike, by the summer of 1995 the democratic press (Moscow
News, Izvestiia, Novoe vremia, Sevodnia and others) had essentially returned to its former
position of weighing things, calling for acting within the limits of the law. At the same time, the
opponents of freedom of conscience did not repeat their massive press campaign of 1993,
preferring to work behind in the scenes in the corridors of power, and thereby totally ignoring
public opinion in the spirit of the Bolshevik epoch.
All higher state officials (with the exception of the President and A. Krasikov, head of the
council for religion under the President) - that is S. Shakrai, G. Mikhailov, A. Kudriavtsev
(official of the department for registration of religious bodies in the Ministry of Justice), the
adviser to the prime minister on religious matters Andrei Sebentsov, Duma staff member V.
Polosin, took the side of restricting freedom of conscience. Similarly one can say of the
representatives of the "traditional" religions: the heads of their administrative structures (chief
Rabbi of Russia, A. Shaevich, the supreme Mufti, leaders of the Union of Evangelical Christian
Baptists) supported the idea of restrictions. Further, confessional leaders at lower levels (Oblast
and city), it seems, began to understand the danger of attempting to set limits between pure and
not pure religions. The head of the Russian Catholics, Archbishop Tadeush Kondrushevich took
an ambivalent position - he spoke out against restrictions on religious freedoms, but agreed with
Met. Kirill of Smolensk that some sort of restriction (not for Catholics, of course) was necessary.
Public opinion as a whole did not support the idea of restriction on religious freedoms, of
privileges for the Moscow Patriarchy, and of persecuting foreign preachers and non-orthodox.
According to a study carried out in the summer of 1995, 80% of the Muslims, and even 30% of
Orthodox believers themselves were worried about the threat of Orthodoxy becoming established
officially. But at the same time 60% of those Orthodox interviewed considered it desirable to
strengthen the union between church and state still more. Of the Orthodox and Muslims, 60%
were against, and only 30% of Catholics and Protestants were "against the right of freedom to
preach for 'nontraditional religions'".
Today in Russia the legislation on freedom of conscience is more democratic than is the
psychology of the political elite. Civil Society does not exist, but one can say that public opinion
is more inclined to tolerance and less nationalistic than is true of upper officialdom. There are no
forces sufficiently well organized to resist the attempts of the Nomenklatura to bring society
under its control, but there are also no forces that would actively help the officials place one of
the religions into the ruling religion. All in all, over the course of time an economic order will
emerge in Russia, similar to that in several Latin American countries, where the economy is
under the control of the bureaucracy. Then the bureaucrats will also try to use the church (i.e.
Orthodoxy in Russia), but not to give the church any real political influence. The history of Latin
American countries shows, that in such conditions the influence of the ruling church collapses
and the sermons of Protestants and new religious movements enjoy great success. As a whole,
the future of religious freedom in Russia depends less on conditions in the religious sphere, than
it does on the general developments in the spiritual and political situation.
First Reading of New Law - July 10, 1996
The State Duma approved the first reading of a new Law on Freedom of Religious

Confession on July 10, 1996. Viktor Zorkal'tsev, standing as a Communist, and who had already
under Khasbulatov headed the committee on religion, repeated in his introduction to the bill the
steps that had led to their resolve to oppose religious freedom since the moment in 1990 when
that very democratic law went into effect, namely that in the sphere of religion there reigns a
"legal vacuum", sects are proliferating, and foreign missionaries are interfering.
The old law had underlined that religious freedom "has no limits, ... which is necessary
for the rights and freedoms of other persons" (from the preamble). The new bill added to the
personal "the preservation of the country's defense and state security" (art. 3, pt. 2) The
introduction of the terms "state security", and "social order" suddenly transforms the law from a
document of rights to a declaration of totalitarianism, for its understandings are totally vague so
courts and governmental officials can interpret it as they wish. That, properly speaking has been
the case throughout the entire post revolutionary era through to the present day.
The new law has eliminated any understanding of the foreign citizen or person without
citizenship, which in the old law gave them equal rights to Russian citizens for freedom of
religious confession. This was done in order to sharply reduce the activities of foreign
missionaries, deemed undesirable to the government. Nor can the Russian citizen rejoice that
much - the entire article 5 of the present law giving the "guarantee of freedom of religious
confession" has been left out. True, the guarantee was merely declaratory, during the past five
years Russian courts and officials took actions against believers who displeased them. Now they
will be able to do so legally.
In general the new law is most frightening there where it removed many of the provisos
from the previous law that had limited the totalitarian tendencies of the authorities so typical for
Russia. Now the prohibition against showing one religious orientation in official documents
(article 5) is lifted. Article 8 which had prohibited the creation of executive and administrative
organs of state power and duties, specially designated for dealing with religious questions and
connected with the realization of the rights of a citizen to freedom of religious confession, now is
lifted. In essence, these organs and agencies have already done a great deal, all former officials
of the Council of Religious Affairs retained their jobs, merely with new titles. But this was done
illegally, now the innumerable consultants, quite apart from the councils of religion - whether
presidential or oblast government - will be legalized.
The former law declared the right of the child to freedom of conscience: "The state
respects the rights of the child and its parents or legal guardian to secure the religious and moral
instruction of the child in accord with its own conviction" (art. 9). This was too vague, because it
remained unclear, how much the parents had the right to direct the child in religious matters. The
new law (art. 3, pt. 6) eliminated the vagueness: "Parents or guardians who prevent the child
from exercising its right to freedom of conscience, which is epxressed in forcing the child to
participate or not to participate in religious rituals...". So generally, if the police see that you are
taking the child to church and it is whining, you will not escape prison. More seriously, the law
on the one hand permits a court judgment for involving one's child in an undesirable sect, and, on
the other hand the law could send a child to prison for leaving the parents to enter a monastery,
for violating the civil rights of parents, i.e "for the denial of parental responsibilty to the children
and of the children to the parents". How much "responsibility" remained undefined, as did "state
security", so here also the way to absolute arbitrariness is opened.

The current revolution (namely that of the Bolsheviks) is completely toward registration the existing law envisions registering the statute of a religious organization (art. 20), the new
speaks of registering the religious organization itself. That is, at present no one may prohibit the
activities of a religious community, at most the court can take away its right to juridical
personhood. With the new law, the court can liquidate the congregation as a whole (art. 12),
occasioned by mere disturbance of the peace. If the present law emphasizes that "a legal
violation by an individual member of a religious body is not the responsiblity of the body as a
whole" (art. 21), that point is now eliminated. Now, if one monk gets drunk, the entire monastery
can be closed, indeed Orthodoxy in its entirety could be forbidden. But of course, the monks can
drink in peace, the law was written against other people. The Krishnaites, Catholics, Baptists the principle of corporate responsibility applies to them.
In addition to the notorious danger to society and "undermining of state security" (yes,
the word 'undermine' returns again to legal parlance) what has become criminal is "causing harm
to the moral, physical and psychological health of citizens" - all of them as undefined charges.
There is a quite comical point introduced especially for the Moscow Patriarchate in art. 3,
pt. 3: "Persons, with priestly rank, are excluded from military service during peace time". The
benefactors of Orthodoxy failed to take the time to define the term "priestly rank" in juridical
terms. They thought, that this was self-evident, that this did not refer to some elder from the
Jehovah Witnesses nor to a Krishnaite teacher. Already, without any special legislation,
Orthodox seminarians and priests only were excluded from militaary service, were placed in a
special list, which was not called on in Chechnia. It is striking, that the active building of
Orthodox churches in military garrisons, resumed in recent years, contradicts both the current
and the new law.
The present law is more democratic, since its article 11 emphasizes that the state merely
controls the adherence to the law on freedom of religious confession. The new law (art. 24, pt. 2)
announces: "Those organs (agencies) having registered religious organizations, exercise control
on the observance of the activities of the religious organizations with reference to its constituted
goals". Such an unlimited formula gives the official the right to enter into the holy of holies,
poke his nose into any corner, or not do so, according to the whim of the official.
In the present law, it is true, there is a silly point, never yet applied, to the effect that only
a religious organization may produce liturgical materials and cult objects. The new law add to
this the "exclusive right" of registered religious organizations to "establish institutions of
professional religious education" (art. 17). In this way, registration shifts from being a right or
the possiblity to get an advantage, to an unavoidable duty, if one wants to preach or teach clergy
in Russia. This should cause all those making crosses, icons or any other symbolic ornaments for
"religious organizations" to tremble. The state is helping the holy fathers set up some
competition!
It would be easy to punish sectarians - it makes no difference whether Catholics or
Mormons - with the two simple phrases "state security" and "foreign preachers". Article 11 refers
to "procedures, established by the government". Such procedures have already been determined
and merely await passage of the law. The Russian Ministry of justice by request of the
government has already drafted a bill: Regulations for opening a representative office for foreign
religious organizations in the Russian Federation. Point 9 of the proposed regulations envisions

for the registration of "travelling missionaries", as now named in specified circles, receiving
some sort of fee. One can rest assured it will not be a small fee. But the most grandiose
expectation is in point 14 - registration is granted merely for three years, after which the
procedure is repeated, half the fee is collected again.
It is understood of course, that no where in the world do representives of the Moscow
Patriarchate pay a fee for registration or that re-registration is required every three years. To
consider foreign religious workers as a milk cow happens only in Russia. Moreover, those
milking the foreigners are the very same people, who call them 'locusts' and 'wolves in sheep's
clothing'.
The foreign missionary in Russia is required to submit "constitution, a certificate or
registration or similar document which affirm that the religious organization functions officially
in its corresponding foreign territory". The papal nuncio, naturally, would not be permitted to
live in Russia, because the Roman Pope is nowhere registered. Since in the USA in general, the
state is separated from religion, even Billy Graham would not be able to submit the required
affidavit.
Nor does the gathering of numerous papers suffice. The representatives of foreign
religions must show that their actions are "not directed toward changing the fundamental
consitutional structure of the Russian Federation nor violate its integrity, undermining state
security, establishing armed bands, inciting to social, racial, national and religious hatred". All
the dreams of the former communist "specialists on religion", safely carrying out their former
trickery in various governmental departments, are now on paper. According to article 8 of the
regulation, officials of the ministry of justice have the right "to check the veracity of the
information provided" (with trips, apparently, to the Vatican or New York, why confirm
information on the Roman Pope and on Billy Graham in Russia). More so in point 23, according
to which the official "in the case of repeated violations of the governmental legislation of the
Russian Federation during the course of a year" may shut down the activities of the foreign
religious representation, without handing the matter over to the courts.
There is no doubt that the new law will be passed by the Duma (no sooner than October
1996). For the defense of freedom of conscience, not long ago there was to be established a
public committee for the defense of freedom of conscience, a Russian department of the
International Association for Religious Freedom. But sitting on the committee are persons such
as Viacheslav Polosin, the very one who as a deputy in Khasbulatov's`house, worked actively to
restrict freedom of religious confession. And the International Association for Religious
Freedom throughout its years of existence has only managed to produce one brochure and send
out one mailing. Unfortunately, in this sphere there is too much fluff, not worrying about issues
but about appearances - to get some grant from the west to struggle for freedoms, but beyond that
to let the grass grow. Westerners also seem less concerned about freedom of conscience in
general, than about freedom of conscience for 'their own' - Mormons, Adventists, Catholics, but
not for everybody.
The final hope, if strange, is in Yeltsin (and now also his head of the presidential
committee for religion, Shumeiko). Perhaps he will remember, that the numerous attempts to
review, amend, change the Law on Freedom of Conscience came from his political opponents. It
is no accident: freedom cannot be divided, one cannot freely choose a president without also

freely choosing one's faith.
EDITOR'S SUPPLEMENT
Between the publication of the first and second parts of Yakov Krotov's essay - which
covered the time period between 1990 and late 1996 - the world press drew attention to the latest
conflict between the Russian Duma and President Yeltsin's office on rewriting the 1990 law.
Before summarizing those developments, it may be helpful to restate Krotov's arguments in an
abbreviated form.
There has been a Law on Freedom of Religious Confession (FRC) in force in the Russian
Federation since October 1990. Since 1992 the elected deputies to the Duma, then also key
spokespersons for the Russian Orthodox church, have begun efforts toward renewed restrictions
on religious freedom. The apparent concerns are the perceived need to stop harmful cults and
Western missionaries from proselytizing among Orthodox faithful. The statistical impact of both
'threats' is negligible. Krotov weaves into his presentation an argument to show how a
communist mindset of controlling society has shaped those groups, who were worried about
Western influence in the growing chaos, in formulating their strategies of response. In the first
phase, new restrictive legislation was passed by a Duma that was then declared dissolved as
Yeltsin battled against Khasbulatov and Rutskoi in the autumn of 1993. There followed a new
Russian constitution and a second round of draft legislation on religion with the President's
office stepping in January 10, 1995 and warning that the proposed bill violated rights guaranteed
in that constitution. Krotov's final sections describe two concurrent developments: 1) Attempts to
combine contradictory legislative bills into a new revision that was then approved at a first
reading on July 10, 1996; and 2) The de facto functioning of agencies to oversee and control
religious affairs headed by former Council of Religious Affairs officials. In Krotov's summary,
the July 1996 revision was really a new law replacing the 1990 FRC, but adding four worrisome
features: 1) the possibility to prohibit a religious organization; 2) restricting the activity of
preachers (i.e. missionaries); 3) state support of Orthodoxy; 4) and state controls of religion.
On June 23, 1997 the lower house of the Russian Duma approved (300 for, 5 against) the
full text of the new Law on Religious Confessions, the revised text of which had emerged from
committee only on June 6. Patriarch Aleksey defended the law by restating the need to stop sects
deemed harmful to society and to restrict the proselytizing activity of "false missionaries". His
own actions in cancelling a meeting with Pope John Paul II that week symbolized the broad
negative meaning Russian Orthodox were giving to 'mission activity' of other confessions, seeing
this as a threat to Orthodoxy rather than as mission in a predominantly secular society.
Human rights organizations and religious bodies in the West expressed grave concern
about the proposed restrictions. The main concerns were:
1. Elevating official Orthodoxy to a privileged position, recognizing a few other
ethnically based traditions (Islam, Buddhism, Judaism) and leaving "other religions and
local beliefs" at a third rank only.
2. Re-registration requirements (by the end of 1998) and requiring excessively
large numbers of signatures (100,000) and geographic spread (have congregations in at
least half of the provinces) to qualify as an "all-Russian" religious organization.

3. Making vulnerable the status of religious bodies advocating conscientious
objection to military service, alternative schooling and alternative medicine (Article 12).
4. Special procedures for registering foreign religious organizations, including
relief and service agencies, which in effect violates the Russian Constitution's principle of
"equal rights for all religious believers".
5. The de facto restoration of a state body for religious affairs, staffed by officials
from the old apparat, with extensive powers of interpretation and regulation.
A month later, on July 22, 1997, Yeltsin sent the bill back to the Duma and Federation
Council, requesting amendments before he would sign it. This means that in September 1997 the
Duma will attempt either to incorporate Yeltsin's concerns or else demand his signature and seek
to override his likely veto with a two-thirds majority. In his remarks to the Duma, Yeltsin
conceded that a law was needed that achieved two things: 1) "it must protect the moral and
spiritual health of the nation... 2) "raise reliable barriers to radical sects which inflict great
damage on the physical and mental health of our citizens...". Yeltsin was now also affirming the
Patriarch's concerns in a general way, but the three concerns he went on to enunciate did require
some quite basic re-writing of the law. In the first place, many of the new law's provisions
"infringe upon the citizens' constitutional and human rights". Secondly it would "legalize
inequality between different confessions" which was "at variance with Russia's international
commitments". Further, he went on to predict that in its present form the proposed law would
isolate Russia's traditional confessions [from the West presumably] and "give rise to religious
conflicts"...
Yeltsin too, claimed that "ten other main religious organizations of Russia" supported the
proposed legislation. In its report, however, Keston News Service stated that during the previous
six weeks the Baptist Union, Pentecostal Union, Seventh Day Adventists, Union of Councils for
Soviet Jews, Roman Catholic Church, Reform (or Initsiativniki) Baptists, Russian Orthodox Free
Church, Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, the Old Believers and individuals within the Russian
Orthodox Church had all formally protested the law, to say nothing of the criticism from the
Sakharov center and the European Union. Since that list encompasses the usual list of
confessional bodies [Christian] that have been present during the Soviet period, it is hard to
guess which Yeltsin's ten organizations would represent.
Finally, even for those inclined to grant Russian Orthodoxy some preferential treatment
as the equivalent of a Volkskirche, it is disturbing to note that this legislation helps to legitimate
the structures of financial corruption into which the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox church
has been drawn. Carey Scott, recently returned Moscow correspondent of the Sunday Times
(London), detailed the Patriarchate's involvement in dubious financial dealings. The church's
bank accounts are not subject to scrutiny by the tax authorities and have therefore attracted the
attention of mobsters eager to launder money. Last year when it became known that the
Patriarchate's importation of tax exempt alcohol and tobacco (10% of all imports) had cost the
state $40 million in lost revenues, Patriarch Aleksey requested the government to rescind its tax
free status. But early in 1997 the church's external affairs department again applied to customs
authorities for tax free status. Moreover, the documents in the defense ministry that Carey Scott
was privy to, told the story of a joint bank account between the defense ministry and the
Patriarchate whereby profits from the sale of defense ministry property were to be channeled into

a charity fund for invalids and army widows. That accounted received $28 million in the next
year even though the ministry fell far behind in paying soldier's salaries, etc. Investigators found
no evidence that any of the money went to army widows, orphans, kindergartens or other needy it was diverted to the private use of army brass and to fund the luxurious living of some in the
church hierarchy, including the two private airplanes owned by Metropolitan Kirill of
Kaliningrad and Smolensk. Already in 1994 the deputy finance minister, Vavilov, had issued a
report on the abuse of the 200 'charitable funds' under the defense ministry's control, with only
10-15% actually applied to charity. Now the church hierarchy is accused of corruption, but is
deemed too powerful to worry about facing trial, and this at a time, as Larry Uzzell, Moscow
representative of Keston Institute, put it when "the typical Russian Orthodox parish is teetering
on the very brink of survival".
The time still seems distant when the finances of the Russian Orthodox church become
open to public scrutiny and it might serve as a model for how doing good in Christ's name
presumes moral probity. As Uzzell, himself Orthodox, observed in June, one of the reasons for
converts to Old Believers, Baptists or Seventh Day Adventists is that "more and more people are
getting fed up with the church leadership being in bed with a corrupt oligarchy". It seems fair to
ask how restrictions on a few sectarian groups could "protect the moral and spiritual health of the
nation" when at the same time the leadership of the church claiming the longer tradition of moral
and spiritual leadership is perceived to be so corrupt. Something else than a legal amendment is
needed to change perceptions.
(Walter Sawatsky, August 1997).

